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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Border searches of electronic devices are on the rise. In 2015, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) examined 8,503 devices. The number more than doubled the following 
year before soaring in 2017 to more than 30,000 searches.1 U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), in turn, reported the search of 4,444 cellphone and 320 
other electronic devices in 2015.2 In 2016, ICE eclipsed these numbers, searching 23,000 
electronic devices.3 
Three legal arguments support the examination of travelers’ digital data. First, 
conducted with an eye towards national security, border searches are a concomitant of 
                                                 
* This statement is adapted from a draft of an essay that is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal 
Forum. Preferred Citation: Laura K. Donohue, Electronic Search and Seizure at the Border, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. (forthcoming). 
** Agnes N. Williams Research Professor; Director, Center on National Security and the Law; and Director, 
Center on Privacy & Technology, Georgetown Law. 
1 U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Releases Statistics on Electronic Device Searches, CBP (April 11, 
2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-statistics-electronic-device-
searches-0; CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics, CBP 
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-
electronic-device-directive-and; U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, 
CBP Directive No. 3340-049A (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-
Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf [hereinafter CBP 
DIRECTIVE]. 
2 Daniel Victor, What Are Your Rights if Border Agents Want to Search Your Phone?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/business/border-enforcement-airport-phones.html 
3 Id. 
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sovereignty and firmly within Article I and Article II powers.4 Second, case law and 
statutory provisions recognize an exception to the warrant requirement and broad powers 
of search at the border. Further, Congress’s power to set the contours stems from the 
Commerce Clause.5 Third, as an empirical matter, the actual number of searches taking 
place is a drop in the sea of international travelers: in 2017, CBP searched fewer than 
1/100th of 1% of all travelers (0.007 percent).6 Weighed against the significant 
governmental interests at stake (e.g., stopping terrorism, catching individuals involved in 
human trafficking and child pornography, and preventing individuals involved in 
international crime from entering the United States), a balancing test favors broad 
authorities. 
Arguments mounted against the government center on the nature of the information 
that can be obtained. While the law focuses on material goods, such as containers or 
suitcases,7 electronic devices contain enormous amounts of information about 
individuals’ private lives. It includes not just data related to the actual crossing, but 
details that stretch years into the past and generate insight into individuals’ relationships, 
thoughts, and beliefs. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in Riley v. California, mobile 
devices contain “the privacies of life.”8 In an increasingly globalized world, allowing 
broad collection powers at the borders allows for an end-run around important Fourth 
Amendment protections. Beyond this, there are significant implications for citizens’ First 
Amendment rights of association and religion; 5th Amendment due process rights and 
privilege against self-incrimination; and 6th Amendment right to counsel.  
The issue of electronic border search is complicated by parallel incursions by 
agencies into cloud data, which occurs in one of two ways: by using the device to access 
information held on the cloud, or by requiring travelers to provide identifiers or handles, 
or account login credentials (such as usernames and passwords) to access social media. 
This issue appears to have first presented in December 2016 when CBP started asking 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., CBP Jan. Directive, supra note 1, at para. 4 (“The plenary authority of the Federal Government to 
conduct searches and inspections of persons and merchandise crossing our nation’s borders is well-
established and extensive; control of the border is a fundamental principle of sovereignty,” citing United 
States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) in support: “[T]he United States, as sovereign, has the 
inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting its territorial integrity.”) See also United 
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (stating, “[t]he border-search exception is grounded in the 
recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, 
who and what may enter the country.”); id. at 616 (“That searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-
standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into 
this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require 
no extended demonstration.”); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“Since the 
founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches 
and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties 
and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472–
73 (1979) (“The authority of the United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is 
based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity. By reason of that authority, it is 
entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right to enter and to bring into the country 
whatever he may carry.”). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (observing, “searches of 
persons and packages at the national borders rest on different considerations…from domestic regulations. 
The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers’ [t]o regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations.’ Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. Historically, such broad powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and 
to prevent prohibited articles from entry.”)  
6 U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and 
FY17 Statistics, CBP (Jan. 5, 2018), www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-
border-search-electronic-device-directive-and. 
7 Daniel Victor, Forced Searches of Phones and Laptops at U.S. Border are Illegal, Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/technology/aclu-border-patrol-lawsuit.html 
8 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
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non-U.S. persons entering the country under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to disclose 
their social media identifiers.9  
Initially, the program was to be entirely voluntary. With only the provider/platform 
and social media identifier provided, the government stated that it would only consider 
publicly-available information. In January 2017, however, the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR) filed complaints with the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, alleging that U.S. citizens were being directed to disclose not just their 
passwords to their phones, but also their social media login information.10 Media reported 
that officials were considering new policies to expand CBP scrutiny of cloud content. In 
February 2017, newly-appointed DHS Secretary John Kelly told a Congressional 
Committee that the agency might adopt a provision requiring login information from all 
foreign visa applicants, with the failure to comply resulting in denial of entry. Starting in 
May 2017, login information became required in cases tied to national security. Less than 
a year later, in March 2018, the U.S. Department of State submitted a formal proposal to 
the Office of Management and Budget, requiring that almost all visa applicants list all 
social media identities used over the previous five years, all telephone numbers, all email 
addresses, all international travel, all prior immigration violations, and whether specified 
family members have been involved in terrorist activity.11 The rule change would allow 
the government to vet and identify about 14.7 million people per year, searching any 
social media platforms associated with the individual.12  
The Executive Branch is divided in how it addresses border search of electronic 
devices. In January 2018, CBP issued updated guidelines, superseding the previous 
directive of August 2009.13  The new document explicitly excluded information held on 
the cloud from its search provisions.14 It distinguished between basic and advanced 
searches (the latter involves connecting external equipment “to an electronic device not 
merely to gain access…but to review, copy, and/or analyze its contents.”15 Officers must 
meet a standard of reasonable suspicion or instances “in which there is a national security 
concern.”16 The equivalent 2009 ICE directive has not been updated since the last review 
                                                 
9 Under the VWP, foreign citizens can visit the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa, if they have been 
cleared by the Electronic System for Travel Authorization. 
10 CAIR-FL files 10 complaints with CBP after the Agency Targeted and Questioned American-Muslims 
about Religious and Political Views, CAIR Florida (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.cairflorida.org/newsroom/press-releases/720-cair-fl-files-10-complaints-with-cbp-after-the-
agency-targeted-and-questioned-american-muslims-about-religious-and-political-views.html. See also Sophia 
Cope, Fear Materialized: Border Agents Demand Social Media Data from Americans, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/01/fear-materialized-border-agents-
demand-social-media-data-americans. 
11 U.S. Dep’t of State, 83 Fed. Reg. 13807, 13807-13808 (proposed Mar. 30, 2018). 
12 Brendan O’Brien, U.S. Visa Applicants to be Asked for Social Media History: State Department, REUTERS 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-visa/u-s-visa-applicants-to-be-asked-
for-social-media-history-state-department-idUSKBN1H611P; Matthew Lee, U.S. to Seek Social Media 
Details from All Visa Applicants, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/us-to-seek-social-media-details-from-all-visa-
applicants. 
13 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1. 
14 Id. at para 5.1.2 (“The border search will include an examination of only the information that is resident 
upon the device and accessible through the device’s operating system or through other software, tools, or 
applications. Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored 
remotely. To avoid retrieving or accessing information stored remotely and not otherwise present on the 
device, Officers will either request that the traveler disable connectivity to any network (e.g., by placing the 
device in airplane mode), or, where warranted…Officers will themselves disable network connectivity.”) 
15 Id. at para 5.1.4. 
16 Id. 
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in 2012.17 Like its CBP counterpart, the directive applies to any item containing 
electronic or digital information.18 But unlike its counterpart, it authorizes ICE Special 
Agents to “search, detain, seize, retain, and share electronic devices, or information 
contained therein, with or without individualized suspicion.”19 Agents are not required to 
perform the search in the presence of the owner.20 Consent is not necessary.21 In addition, 
“At any point during a border search, electronic devices, or copies of information 
therefrom, may be detained for further review either on-site at the place of detention or at 
an off-site location.”22 Searches can take place up to 30 days after the information is 
seized, with continuations subject to supervisory approval every 15 days thereafter.23  
The disjunction we are seeing between CBP and ICE reflect two (historical) streams 
of border search authorities: customs and immigration.24 Their objects differ. The first 
stems from efforts to prevent commercial goods from avoiding duties. The second 
focuses on individuals: i.e., who should (or should not) be admitted to the country. In the 
post-9/11 environment, a third, novel approach has steadily entered the legal discussion, 
seeking to use weaker Fourth Amendment protections at the borders as a way to combat 
all criminal activity.  Thus far, the courts have provided a backstop, rejecting some of the 
more egregious cases to come forward. The lack of legislation is of particular concern, as 
it leaves citizens’ privacy at the mercy of each agency’s regulatory regime. The more 
recent cases of Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States herald an evolving 
Supreme Court doctrine that is cognizant of the greater Fourth Amendment issues at 
stake in digital information. Further First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth 
Amendment concerns present. 
II. BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITIES RELATED TO CUSTOMS 
 
Historically, the Executive Branch has had a wide latitude to conduct searches at the 
border without first establishing probable cause and obtaining a warrant.25 That breadth 
derives in part from the evolution of customs law. During the early colonial period, 
                                                 
17 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE DIRECTIVE No. 7-6.1: BORDER SEARCHES OF 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES (Aug. 18, 2009), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ICE 
DIRECTIVE]. 
18 Compare id. at para. 5.2 (“Any item that may contain information, such as computers, disks, drives, tapes, 
mobile phones and other communication devices, cameras, music players, and any other electronic or digital 
devices.”), with CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1, at para 3.2 (“Any device that may contain information in an 
electronic or digital form, such as computers, tablets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other 
communication devices, cameras, music and other media players.”) 
19 2009 ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at para. 6.1. 
20 Id. at para 8.1.2. 
21 Id. at para 8.1.3. 
22 Id. at para 8.1.4. 
23 Id. at para 8.3.1. 
24 Certain border search powers also derive from disease monitoring. These areas of law, however, are less 
relevant to the search of electronic devices and so I do not address them here. For further discussion of the 
evolution of quarantine authorities, see generally Laura K. Donohue, Pandemic Disease, Biological 
Weapons, and War, in LAW AND WAR 84 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds. 
2014), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1296/; Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense and 
Constitutional Constraints, 4 NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT. L. REV. 82 (2014), 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/677/. 
25 In Stacey v. Emery, the Supreme Court explained the contours of probable cause: ‘If the facts and 
circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the 
offense has been committed, it is sufficient.” 97 U. S. 642, 645 (1878). See also Locke v. United States, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813); The George, 10 Fed. Cas. 201 (1815) (No. 5328); The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 
Wall.) 155 (1865).  
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England considered customs in the context of commercial regulation—an opportunity to 
ensure dominance in shipping and trade. Over time, and particularly following the Seven 
Years’ War during which England developed substantial debt, the approach shifted to 
using customs authorities as a way of generating revenue. Officials obtained broad 
powers to interdict “uncustomed,” or illegal materials. Following the American 
Revolution, the latter emphasis survived, laying the groundwork for today’s CBP 
authorities. This history matters, as it demonstrates both the purposes of customs searches 
(i.e., to interdict uncustomed materials and so generate revenue), as well as the special 
protections afforded the home, even where customs issues arise. Both aspects of customs 
searches serve as a limit on the border search exception. 
A. Commercial Regulation versus Revenue Generation 
The American colonies provided England with an opportunity to strengthen its global 
mercantile dominance. From 1621 until 1756, the colonial power thus focused on how to 
structure its laws to control trade. As early as 1621, the Privy Council recognized the 
gains at stake, arguing that “the Commodities brought from” the colony of Virginia ought 
to be “appropriated unto his Majesties subjects” instead of being “communicated to 
forraine countries.”26 Accordingly, the council adopted an ordinance requiring that “all 
Tobacco and other commodities” from Virginia “not be carried into any forraine partes 
until the same have beene first landed here and his Majesties Customes paid therefore.”27  
In the first Navigation Act of 1651, Parliament went on to require that any materials 
to or from the Americas be carried on English ships.28 The aim was to prevent European 
powers from trading with the colonies. Following the Stuart Restoration, in 1660 
Parliament passed the second Navigation Act, re-entrenching the rule that colonial trade 
only be carried out on English vessels: they had to be English-owned, operated by an 
English master, and carry a crew of which three quarters must be English.29 The statute 
did not entirely prevent foreign imports into the colonies—it merely required that they be 
shipped under English flag. Three years later, Parliament addressed this oversight via the 
third Navigation Act, requiring that any European commodities bound for the colonies 
first be taken to England, unloaded, and duties paid, prior to their return to North 
America.30 The preamble to the statute underscored the importance of strengthening the 
connections between England and the colonies, “keeping them in a firmer dependence 
upon” the Crown, and ensuring that English shipping benefitted.31 The goal was to 
establish a monopoly over colonial trade. 
The early navigation statutes reflected a fundamentally flawed assumption: namely, 
that most or all colonial trade involved overseas commerce.32 In the absence of 
regulation, intra-colonial trade (not subject to customs duties) began to flourish, with 
commodities eventually making their way to Europe “to the great Hurt and Diminution 
of” H.M. Customs and trade.33 Parliament closed this gap in the Navigation Act of 1673, 
                                                 
26 THOMAS C. BARROW, TRADE & EMPIRE: THE BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1660-1775, 
at 4 (1999). 
27 Id. 
28 An Act for Increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, (1651) 2 ACTS & 
ORDS. INTERREGNUM 559-62 (Eng.). 
29 An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation of 1660, 12 Car. II c. 18 (Eng.) . 
30 An Act for the Encouragement of Trade 1663, 15 Car. II c. 7 (Eng.) . 
31 Id. 
32 BARROW, supra note 26, at 6. 
33 9 CALENDAR TREASURY BOOKS 1965 (William A. Shaw eds. 1904), http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/search/series/cal-treasury-books [hereinafter C.T.B.] (noting that “[t]he act of 1673 did more to 
systemize the commercial activities of the colonists than did any other regulation of the navigation acts 
except the enumeration, of which it was an integral part. It affected not only the commercial relations 
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requiring that a bond be paid on enumerated items where the ship travelled between 
plantations.34 But the enforcement devices were weak. They also differed from those in 
place in England. In the late 17th century, customs agents could search “any ship, house, 
or place soever” in London to search for prohibited goods.35 The Treasurer could provide 
a warrant to the customs commissions to examine trunks and boxes held at the Custom 
House in Southampton.36 There was no equivalent in the new world. 
In the 18th Century, Britain tried to tighten its hold, assuming greater powers to 
search for, and to seize, contraband.37 Lord Grenville, the First Lord of the Treasury, and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, famously considered the colonies to be best source of the 
revenues needed, charging the colonies with a failure to offset the costs of their own 
defense.38 Towards this end, he repeatedly argued in Westminster for more stringent 
customs enforcement in North America. Many agreed, so when the Molasses Act 
expired, Parliament passed a measure that emphasized both mercantilism and revenue 
generation. The preamble to the American Revenue Act of 1764 (a.k.a. the Sugar Act) 
explained, “[I]t is expedient that new provisions and regulations should be established for 
improving the revenue of this kingdom, and for extending and securing the navigation 
and commerce between Great Britain and your Majesty’s dominions in America.”39 This 
statute, along with the Currency Act of 1764 (in which Britain assumed control of the 
colonial system of currency), laid the groundwork for the revolt that followed the 
introduction of the Stamp Act of 1765.40 
B. Contraband in the Early American Republic  
Following independence, English mercantile ambitions fell away, but, like England 
following the Seven Years’ War, the United States needed to raise revenue to pay for the 
recent war. This required efficient enforcement mechanisms. Thus, from the earliest days 
of the Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to search for contraband without 
first obtaining a warrant. To find the same items within a dwelling house, building, or 
                                                                                                                                     
between England and her colonies but also the relations of the colonies among themselves...The new 
requirement made necessary the installation in colonial ports of a large number of customs officials, whom 
there had been no need before, appointed after 1696 on the English establishment by the customs 
commissioners under authority from the Treasury. The business of these officials was to receive, retain, and 
if necessary prosecute, the bonds in the common law courts and collect the duties, which were supposed to be 
those of the English book of rates, payable in silver or its equivalent at sterling values. The object of the act 
was not revenue but the regulation of trade.”) 
34 Navigation Act of 1673, 25 Car. II c. 7 (Eng.). 
35 Compare Entry Book: October 1663, in 1 C.T.B. 547, 550 with Entry Book: December 1661, in 1 C.T.B. 
311, 315 (directing John Seymour and Charles Smith “to search for all wares and merchandize mentioned in 
the royal proclamation of November 20 last for prohibiting the importation of divers foreign wares and 
merchandizes into this realm of England and Wales.”) 
36 Entry Book: April 1661, in 1 C.T.B. 232, 236. 
37 GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOMS HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2016). 
38 Philip Lawson, George Grenville and America: The Years of Opposition, 1765-1770, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 
561 (1980).  
39 An act for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America,; for continuing, 
amending, and making perpetual, an act passed in the sixth year of the reign of his late majesty King George 
the Second for applying the produce of such duties, and of the duties to arise by virtue of the said act, towards 
defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the said colonies and plantations; for 
explaining an act made in the twenty fifth year of the reign of King Charles the Second, (intituled, An act for 
the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland trades, and for the better securing the plantation trade;) and 
for altering and disallowing several drawbacks on exports from this kingdom, and more effectually 
preventing the clandestine conveyance of goods to and from the said colonies and plantation, and improving 
and securing the trade between the same and Great Britain. 
See also FRED ANDERSON, The American Duties Act (The Sugar Act), in CRUCIBLE OF War: THE SEVEN 
YEARS' WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at 572 (2000).  
40 Duties in American Colonies Act 1765, 5 Geo. III c. 12 (Eng.). 
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other place, customs officers first had to obtain a warrant based upon “cause to 
suspect.”41 
In 1789, the same year that Congress passed the Bill of Rights to the states for 
ratification, it enacted statutes setting duties, establishing international ports of entry, 
requiring vessels to report their contents, and providing for inspectors to board vessels to 
examine whether the stated goods comported with the items on board.42 Under the Act of 
July 31, 1789, officials could board any vessel, “in which they shall have reason to 
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein 
to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise.”43 Where 
suspecting that such materials be concealed in a “dwelling house, store, building, or other 
place,” they could apply to a justice of the peace for a warrant to conduct a search for the 
goods, “and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial.”44 
These statutes were followed by statutes in 1790, 1793, and 1799, which underscored 
the importance of the enforcement of duties.45 So we find, contemporaneous with the 
drafting and adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First, Second, and Fourth 
Congresses signaling that there was no need to obtain a warrant for goods subject to 
forfeiture when held in a ship or vessel; however, when held in a warehouse, building, or 
dwelling, a warrant was required. 
Congress continued to follow this line in the Act of July 18, 1866.46 That statute 
made it lawful for any customs officer “to go on board of any vessel, as well without as 
within his district, and to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or 
envelope on board, and to this end, to hail and stop such vessel if under way, and to use 
all necessary force to compel compliance.”47 Where it appeared “that any breach or 
violation of the laws of the United States [had] been committed” whereby “such vessel, 
                                                 
41 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
42 An Act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandizes imported into the United States, Act of July 
4, 1789, §§ 1, 3, 4, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24, 24-27 (1789) (setting duties); An Act to regulate the Collection of the 
Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported 
into the United States, Act of July 31, 1789, § 1, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 29 (1789) (establishing districts, ports, and 
officers); §2 (establishing ports for non-U.S. vessels); id. §4 (requiring master or commander of every ship or 
vessel to provide “a true manifest of the cargo on board such ship or vessel”); id. §5 (empowering inspection 
of the vessels “to examine whether the goods imported are conformable to the entries thereof.”); id. §10 
(requiring that the master or commander of the vessel provide the manifest to the inspector with “a true 
account of the loading which such ship or vessel had on board at the port from which she last sailed, and at 
the time of her sailing, or at any time since, the packages, marks and numbers, and noting thereon to what 
port in the United Stats such ship or vessel is bound, and the name or names of the person or persons to 
whom the goods are consigned, or in cases where the goods are shipped to order, the names of the 
shippers.”); id. §12 (prohibiting any goods, wares, or merchandise from being unladen or delivered from any 
ship or vessel at night or without a permit from the collector); An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, 
Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes, Sept. 1, 1789, § 3, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55, 55-56 (1789) 
(empowering the surveyor to measure every vessel to ascertain its tonnage); An Act to suspend part of an 
Act, intitled ‘An Act to regulate the collection of the Duties imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships or 
Vessels, and on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises, imported into the United States,’ Sept. 16, 1789, §3, ch. 
15, 1 Stat. 69, 69-70 (1789) (setting duties on certain foreign goods). 
43 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 24, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 43, 47. (1789) (current version codified at 19 U.S.C §§ 
482, 1582). 
44 Id. 
45 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 48–51, 1 Stat. 145, 170 (1790); Act of February 18, 1793, ch. 8, §27, 1 Stat. 
305, 315 (1793); Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68–71, 1 Stat. 627, 677, 678 (1799). See also Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (noting that Congress has always provided the Executive with plenary power to 
search and seize at the border, absent probable cause or a warrant to regulate duties/prevent introduction of 
contraband). See also An Act further to regulate the entry of merchandise imported into the United States 
from any adjacent territory, Mar. 2, 1821, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 616. 
46 An Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes, Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178. 
47 Id. § 2. 
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or the goods, wares, and merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by 
such vessel, is or are liable to forfeiture,” then the customs officer had the authority to 
seize the items.48 The statute also empowered officers to “arrest any person engaged in 
such breach or violation” and to pursue and arrest anyone who tried to escape.49 The 
officers could stop, search, and examine “any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom 
he or they shall suspect there are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject to duty 
or shall have been introduced into the United States in any matter contrary to law.”50 The 
statute reflected the importance of securing things to demonstrate the illegal movement of 
uncustomed goods—namely, the vehicle, beast, “goods, wares, merchandize, and all 
other appurtenances, including trunks, envelopes, covers, and all means of concealment, 
and all the equipage, trappings, or other appurtenances of such beast.”51 
C. Contemporary Search Authorities at Border Crossings 
In 1930, the (ill-fated) Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act significantly increased tariffs on 
agricultural and industrial goods.52 Eight years later, an amendment to the act also 
provided for special inspection, examination, and search authorities.53 As subsequently 
amended, the law now reads: 
 
Whenever a vessel from a foreign port or place or from a port or place in any 
Territory or possession of the United States arrives at a port or place in the 
United States or the Virgin Islands, whether directly or via another port or place 
in the United States or the Virgin Islands, the appropriate customs officer for 
such port or place of arrival may, under such regulations as the Secretary of the 
Treasury may prescribe and for the purpose of assuring compliance with any law, 
regulation, or instruction which the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs 
Service is authorized to enforce, cause inspection, examination, and search to be 
made of the persons, baggage, and merchandise discharged or unladen from such 
vessel, whether or not any or all such persons, baggage, or merchandise has 
previously been inspected, examined, or searched by officers of the customs.54 
 
The law empowers customs officers, at any time, to board any vessel or vehicle,  
 
within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act 
[19 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.], or at any other authorized place, without as well as 
within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and 
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. § 3. 
51 Id. 
52 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 4). See also Robert Whaples, Where Is 
There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions, 55 
J. ECON. HIST. 139, 151 (1995) (finding consensus among economic historians that the Act “exacerbated the 
Great Depression.”) 
53 Customs Administrative Act of 1938, ch. 679, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 
1467). 
54 19 U.S.C. § 1467. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (“The appropriate customs officer may cause an examination 
to be made of the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are 
contained therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited notwithstanding a declaration and 
entry therefor has been made.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (providing for entry examination of imported 
merchandise). 
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person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such 
vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.55 
 
The Secretary of the Treasury may issue regulations for searching persons and baggage.56 
Further, “he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the examination and search of 
persons of their own sex; and all persons coming into the United States from foreign 
countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the 
Government under such regulations.”57 The border exception applies both to ingress and 
egress to and from the United States.58 
 The level of suspicion required to search travelers for illegal goods as they cross the 
border increases as the search becomes more intrusive. Courts, for instance, do not 
require particularized suspicion for the contents of a traveler’s briefcase, luggage, purse, 
or pockets.59 Nor is it required for documents contained within containers in such items.60 
Pictures, films and other graphic materials do not earn any higher level of protection.61 A 
pat-down warrants “minimal suspicion.”62  
 In contrast, the search of a travelers’ undergarments and strip searches require “real 
suspicion.”63 The only context thus far recognized by the Supreme Court as requiring 
individualized suspicion is related to the intimate physical search of a woman believed to 
be smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal.64 In the 1985 case United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, customs officials suspected that a woman had swallowed balloons 
containing drugs.65 The Supreme Court determined that reasonable suspicion was 
required to detain the individual until the drugs had passed.66 This decision followed on a 
series of lower court cases rejecting mere suspicion for intrusive body searches, requiring 
a “clear indication” or “plain suggestion” of criminal activity.67 
                                                 
55 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a).  
56 19 U.S.C. § 1582. Implementing regulations can be found at 19 C.F.R. §§ 23.1, 23.5, 23.11. 
57 Id. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 582, 46 Stat. 590, 748. 
58 United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir. 1995). 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2002); Henderson v. United States,390 F.2d 
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). But note that suspicion cannot be based merely on ancestry as a basis for detention 
and questioning. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
60 See United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (9th Cir.1979). 
61 United States v. Thirty–Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971). 
62 See, e.g., People of the Territory of Guam v. Sugiyama, 846 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1988) (pat-down 
appropriate when suspect known to be connected to packages of marijuana previously sent to airport); United 
States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir.1984), vacated in part, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(pat-down justified when objects frequently used in narcotics smuggling found in the traveler’s suitcase); 
United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d 1099, 110-01 (9th Cir. 1983) (pat-down appropriate where 
traveler paid cash for the ticket, appeared nervous, and story conflicted with co-traveler); United States v. 
Carter, 563 F.2d 1360, 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (pat-down appropriate when traveler appeared nervous and did 
not directly answer questions about trip); United States v. Rivera-Marquez, 519 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir. 
1975) (pat-down appropriate when informer told agents that individual with traveler’s name would be 
smuggling drugs on that day). See also United States v. Romero, 71 F. Supp.2d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (pat-
down of traveler did not meet the minimal suspicion standard). 
63 Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 505; United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970). 
64 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding “real suspicion” was present when 
Mr. Vance, traveling from Hawaii to Guam, underwent a pat-down search). In that case, a customs officer 
observed that the traveler was glassy-eyed, disoriented, and had trouble answering questions. A pat-down 
revealed two pairs of underwear and a bulge at the traveler’s crotch. When directed to drop his underwear, 
two packs of methamphetamine fell out. 
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Vehicles are subject to a much less rigorous standard than searches of the person. In 
United States v. Flores-Montano, for instance, reasonable suspicion was considered 
sufficient for removing a gas tank to search for contraband.68 The Supreme Court, 
however, has held open the possibility “that some searches of property are so destructive 
as to require” particularized suspicion.69 
 
D. Mail Search 
Customs officers, by statute, have the authority to stop and to search domestic mail 
headed outside the United States, as well as foreign mail transiting the United States.70 
The law is specifically tied to six areas: exportation or importation of monetary 
instruments;71 material related to obscenity or child pornography;72 controlled 
substances;73 nuclear materials covered by the Export Administration Act;74 defense 
articles and services;75 and emergency matters that fall within the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, such as foreign exchange, transfers of credit or 
payments, or the import or export of currency or securities.76 Mail that has not been 
sealed against inspection, and to which the sender or addressee has consented a search, 
can be examined.77 Mail weighing more than 16 ounces that has been sealed against 
inspection can only be opened and searched by a customs officer where there is 
reasonable grounds to suspect that it contains monetary instruments, a weapon of mass 
destruction, or material related to one of the six categories listed above.78 The law 
explicitly forbids reading any correspondence contained in mail sealed against inspection 
absent consent by the sender or addressee, or a search warrant obtained consistent with 
rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.79 Customs officers do not have the 
authority to open and inspect mail weighing 16 ounces or less.80 
A different provision in the code, whose origins stem from 19th century statutes, deals 
specifically with opening trunks or envelopes.81 The standard it sets is “reasonable 
cause.” The statutory language reads: 
 
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may search 
any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause 
to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law.82 
                                                 
68 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). In this case, the Ninth Circuit had taken the term 
“routine” from United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, created a balancing test, and applied it to vehicle 
searches. The Supreme Court objected, determining that searches of vehicles were subject to a much less 
rigorous standard than searches of the person. The 9th circuit went on in United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 
1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) to find the distinction between “routine” and “non-routine” inapplicable to 
searches of property. 
69 Flores-Montano at 155–56, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (holding that complete disassembly and reassembly of a car 
gas tank did not require particularized suspicion.) 
70 19 U.S.C. § 1583. 
71 31 U.S.C. § 5316. 
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1463, 1465, and 1466. 
73 21 U.S.C. § 953. 
74 50 U.S.C. §§ App. 2401 et seq. 
75 22 U.S.C. § 2778. 
76 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702 et seq. 
77 19 U.S.C. § 1583(b). 
78 Id. § 1583(c)(1). 
79 Id. § 1583(c)(2). 
80 Id. § 1583(d). 
81 Id. § 482 (re-codified Rev. Stat.§3061, which derived from the Act of July 18, 1866, ch. § 3, 14 Stat. 178, 
178.) 
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The Supreme Court has noted that the “reasonable cause to suspect” test presents “a less 
stringent requirement than that of ‘probable cause’ imposed by the Fourth Amendment as 
a requirement for the issuance of warrants.”83 The Court has upheld this test as applied to 
border searches as constitutional.84 
E.  Special Protections Afforded the Home 
As the Supreme Court noted in 1977, "[A] port of entry is not a traveler's home."85 
For the latter, as a matter of law, for centuries special protections have applied. From the 
time of Coke’s Institutes (and, arguably, Magna Carta) forward, outside of a fleeing felon 
or the hue and cry, common law forbade access to the home absent a warrant.86 The need 
for such a document pushed on what, precisely would satisfy the requirement. As the 
Crown made increasing use of general warrants, treatise writers and jurists roundly 
condemned the practice as unreasonable—i.e., against the Reason of the common law.87 
Only particular warrants, issued by a magistrate, naming the individual, establishing 
probable cause for a specific crime, and supported by oath or affirmation, met the 
standard.88 The U.S. founders incorporated this common law rule into the Bill of Rights:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.89 
 
 It is important here to remember the mere evidence rule, which similarly continued 
the common law tradition and did not fall out of favor in the United States until 1967, just 
a few months prior to Katz v. United States.90 This rule made it clear that even with a 
particularized warrant, there were certain things that the government could not obtain 
because it interfered with the privacies of life. The court thus drew a distinction between 
the fruits and instrumentalities of crime, on the one hand, and other types of materials. In 
Boyd v. United States, Justice Bradley explained for the Court,  
 
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties 
and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a 
search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of 
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against 
him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled 
to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.91  
 
This distinction reflects in the customs law tradition: 
  
                                                                                                                                     
82 Id. § 482. 
83 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612 (1977). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 618 (1980 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)). 
86 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 CHI. L. REV. 1181 (2016). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
90 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
91 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). 
 12 
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of 
goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties 
payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two 
centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue 
acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by 
Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 
43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same 
Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the 
Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and 
seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the 
prohibition of the amendment.…So, also, the laws which provide for the search 
and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his 
possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery 
tickets, implements of gambling, etc., are not within this category. Many other 
things of this character might be enumerated.92 
 
In other words, Congress (and the Courts) drew a clear distinction between a store or 
dwelling house, or other structure for which a proper warrant was required, and the 
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile, where it was not practicable to obtain 
a warrant because the vehicle could be quickly moved. Thus, under the Act of March 3, 
1815, it was not only lawful to board and search vessels within the customs’ officers’ 
districts and those adjoining, but also to stop and search any vehicle, beast, or person for 
whom there was probable cause to believe unlawful goods had unlawfully been brought 
into the United States.93 The Court, and the government, considered it a valid exercise of 
constitutional power.94 To the extent that a question of distance from the border arose, in 
the 19th century, the Attorney general drew the line at three miles.95 
 In this way, the border exception bore a striking resemblance to the fleeing felon 
exception: it was only in the process of hot pursuit of goods illegally brought into the 
country that broader powers applied. But limits applied: 
 
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to 
stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a 
search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary 
because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country 
to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which 
                                                 
92  Id.  at 623-24 (internal citations omitted). 
93 Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232. For total or partial renewals of the statute, see Act of Apr. 27, 
1816, ch. 110, 3 Stat. 315; Act of Feb. 28, 1865, ch. 67, 13 Stat. 441; Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 
178; section 3061 of the Revised Statutes. 
94 Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1883). See also United States v. One Black Horse, 129 F. 167 (D. Me. 
1904). Similar provisions applied to Indian agents who, suspecting the introduction of alcohol, could cause 
the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds, and places of deposit of such person to be searched and seized. 
Rev. Stat. § 2140 (1875). This power arose from an 1822 statute, which allowed for traders’ goods to be 
searched/seized on basis of suspicion of alcohol (Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 682), as well as the Act 
of June 30, 1834, § 20, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 732. The Supreme Court recognized the Statute of 1822 as 
sufficient for search and seizure in American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358. All statutes cited 
and discussed in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
95 Section 174 of Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, 30 Stat. 1254, 1280. The Attorney General, construing the 
Act, wrote, “If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opinion they have 
power to search any vessel within the three-mile limit according to the practice of customs officers when 
acting under section 3059 of the Revised Statutes [Comp. St. § 5761], and to seize such vessels.’ 26 Op. 
Attys. Gen. 243. Cited and quoted in Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. 
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may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use 
the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search 
unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable 
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal 
merchandise.96  
 
In Carroll v. United States, the Court noted the necessity of establishing probable cause 
of a felony for a search that occurred away from the border.  The border was only 
relevant insofar as it helped to establish probable cause.97  
 Reflecting these traditions, the current state of play, as both a statutory and a 
doctrinal matter, is that customs searches of homes require a warrant, issued by a third 
party federal judge or magistrate, and supported by probable cause that merchandise has 
been illegally brought into the United States, or that the goods in question are subject to 
forfeiture.98 The search of vehicles or vessels, however, is not limited to the time and 
place of actual international crossings.99 
 F.  Extended Border Search and the Functional Equivalent 
For searches away from ports of entry, courts look at whether such actions can be 
upheld as “extended border searches” as well as whether they take place at the 
“functional equivalent” of the border.100 Airports, for instance, are considered the 
functional equivalent of the border.101 The validity of such searches depends upon a 
variety of factors, suggesting a totality of circumstances test. As with searches at the 
actual border, the Fourth Amendment standard of “reasonableness” still applies; however, 
mere suspicion is sufficient.102  
                                                 
96 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54. 
97 Id., at 160. 
98 19 U.S.C. § 1595. 
99 Id. § 482: “(a) Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search, and 
examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom 
he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the 
United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon 
such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may 
have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any such 
officer or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or 
person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, 
or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or charge, 
or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the same for trial. (b) Any 
officer or employee of the United States conducting a search of a person pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
section shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such search if the officer or employee 
performed the search in good faith and used reasonable means while effectuating such search.” This section 
dates back to Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat, 231, 232; Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178. 
100 United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) 
(Search of individual arriving in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico from the United States not satisfied because 
no functional equivalent to international border of the United States) 
101 Almeida–Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“For ... example, a search of the passengers 
and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a non-stop flight from Mexico City would clearly 
be the functional equivalent of a border search.”). 
102 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800, 
803, n. 5 (9th Cir. 1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 623, (1886); Hammond v. United States, 356 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 
814, 817 (9th Cir. 1965); Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124, 130 (9th Cir. 1964, Duniway, J., 
concurring); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 
(5th Cir. 1962); Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 
(9th Cir. 1961); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 
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In cases of continuous surveillance of vehicles transiting the border, the lower courts 
have upheld searches 20 miles from the border that occur 15 hours after entry.103 On the 
other hand, for roving searches, the Supreme Court has held that a warrantless search, 25 
miles north of the border, on an East-West Highway located at all points at least 20 miles 
from border, absent probable cause and reasonable suspicion, was invalid.104 There is no 
border exception outside the actual border or its functional equivalent.105 
 
G. Restrictions on Customs Searches: Who and Why 
The Courts have held that an “officer of the customs” includes customs officers, 
inspectors, investigators, and mail entry aids, certain Immigration and Naturalization 
Service officials (e.g., border patrol agents), and Coast guard officers.106 It has also 
included a doctor aiding a customs search. The right to undertake border searches does 
not extend to the FBI or to law enforcement when acting for general law enforcement 
purposes. Thus, In the 1979 case of United States v. Vidal Soto-Soto, the 9th Circuit 
considered the FBI’s warrantless search of a Chevrolet pickup truck at the border to 
determine whether it had been stolen.107 The agent’s sole basis for stopping the truck was 
due to the make and model of the vehicle.108 The Court looked to the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse, in which it had required articulable and 
                                                                                                                                     
F.2d 285 (2nd Cir. 1936); United States v. Wischerth, 68 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Yee Ngee 
How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 
103 See, e.g., King v. United States 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 US 926 (customs agent, 
based on a tip, followed car at Tijuana crossing); Leeks v. United States, 356 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966) 
(upholding search 15 miles north of San Ysidro border entry, continuous tailing); Alexander v. United States 
362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (heroin discovered after placing vehicle crossing 
into Arizona after surveillance, with only a one or two minute break, reasoning that by statute customs 
officers had long had the express authority to stop, search, examine vehicles suspected of carrying 
merchandise subject to duty, making it possible for them to do what would be “unreasonable” for police, 
supported by courts, use a totality of the circumstances—e.g., time, distance, manner and extent of 
surveillance, etc.); Lee v. United States 376 F2d 98 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (customs 
agent acting on tip placed car from Mexico under surveillance, arrested and found narcotics—upheld because 
continuously under surveillance);  Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States 378 F2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967) (mere 
suspicion acceptable for search that took place 15 hours and 20 miles from the border found marijuana 
hidden in rear door; met totality of the circumstances test—time and distance, extent and manner; constant 
surveillance until car stopped a few miles north of San Diego);  Gonzalez-Alonso v. United States 379 F.2d 
347 (9th Cir. 1967) (marijuana; followed from border, stopped and searched 11 miles inland, found valid, 
applying totality of the circumstances test); Bloomer v. United States 409 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1969) 
(Oldsmobile with marijuana under constant surveillance from time it crossed the border).  
104 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen with a 
valid U.S. work permit was convicted for possession and transfer of marijuana following a warrantless search 
of his automobile. 413 U.S. at 267. The government argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
provided for warrantless searches “within a reasonable distance [defined by regulations as 100 air miles] 
from any external boundary” authorized the search. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(a)(3), codified at 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a). See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (cited in Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268. In a 5-4 opinion, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the statute and regulation were inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. While 
border searches could take place at functional equivalent of the border, searches within 100 miles of the 
border violated the reasonableness clause. The Court also held that the search could not be justified on the 
basis of the rules applied to search of automobiles. In Carroll v. United States, the Court had upheld the 
clause in the Volstead Act that allowed for warrantless search of automobiles where probable cause existed 
that the vehicle in question contained illegal alcoholic beverages. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this case, however, 
the standard of probable cause had not been met. 
105 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
106 See also 19 U.S.C.A. § 1401(i). 
107 United States v. Vidal Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 546  (9th Cir. 1979). 
108 Id. 
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reasonable suspicion that a motorist was unlicensed or an automobile not registered, to 
detain a vehicle and request the registration papers.109   
The reason for the broader authority granted to customs officers than to ordinary law 
enforcement is because the basic purpose behind a border search is to obtain things 
illegally brought into the country. As the 9th circuit noted, “Validity for this distinction is 
found in the fact that the primordial purpose of a search by customs officers is not to 
apprehend persons, but to seize contraband property unlawfully imported or brought into 
the United States.”110 The Court observed, “The authorization of section 581 (19 USC 
§1581) is to ascertain whether there are any dutiable articles concealed in the vessel; it is 
not to discover acts of criminality. If by chance contraband merchandise or dutiable 
articles are discovered, then the Coast Guard officer must arrest any person connected 
with the smuggling of such merchandise.”111 The purpose is “to effectuate the provisions 
of the navigation and tariff laws and to protect the revenue of the United States, 
Congress, by section 581 of the Tariff Act 1930.”112 The purpose of customs law is not to 
deter criminal activity writ large.113 
III. BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITIES RELATED TO IMMIGRATION 
 
Immigration law has a considerably different history and appears in a different area of the 
code. This history sheds light on the differences between CBP and ICE in terms of their 
regulations. It is also a doctrine fraught with contradictions.  
 On the one hand, more than a century ago the plenary power doctrine emerged, 
rejecting any constitutional challenge to Congress’s initial immigration laws.114 In Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, the Court stated that although the Constitution did not 
explicitly address immigration, Congress had the general power to pass a statute 
amending prior Treaties and excluding Chinese citizens.115 Justice Field, writing for the 
Court, said, “The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its 
engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of courts.”116 The 
decision fell to the political branches, rendering any judicial “reflection upon 
[Congress’s] motives, or the motives of any of its members,” immaterial.117 
 
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative 
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not 
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an 
incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could 
not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another 
power.118 
 
                                                 
109 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
110 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (1966). See also The Atlantic. Olson v. United States, 68 
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933). 
111 Atlantic. Olson, 68 at 9. 
112 Id. at 10. 
113 But note that seizure may rest on a violation of criminal law. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 
(1927); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342 (1842); Awalt v. United States, 47 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1931).  
114 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. 
J. 545 (1990). 
115 Id.; An act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, May 6, 1882, ch. 1, 22 Stat. 58. 
116 Id. at 602. 
117 Id. (citing Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1862)). 
118 Id. at 603-604. 
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Such authority was part of the foreign affairs power of any country, found in the 
interstices of Article I(8) and Article II.119 
 Over time, however, the rule that the executive branch and Congress have absolute 
authority over immigration decisions has eroded.120 Thus, while entry without the 
appropriate status may be unlawful, the Supreme Court has held that a child’s 
immigration status cannot impact their access to public elementary and secondary 
education.121 Professor Hiroshi Motomura has argued that the gap between the Court and 
the dissent in that case stems from disparate views of immigration outside legal 
constraints: namely, a contribution to the economy and society, versus “egregious 
lawbreaking.”122 Further complicating the debate is the role of states and cities, as well as 
how (and whether) to integrate unlawful immigrants—including and up to providing a 
path to formal citizenship.123  
 Questions of individual rights have gained ground. U.S. citizens, and individuals with 
a substantial connection to the United States, benefit from the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.124 Non-U.S. persons, however, have no such rights. Immigration officials 
thus have much broader authorities as to aliens. As a matter of statutory law,  
 
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed 
by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant— 
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to 
be or to remain in the United States; 
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to 
enter the United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of 
law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, or to 
arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so 
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is 
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the alien 
arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an 
officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter 
or remain in the United States; 
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United 
States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of 
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and 
within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have 
access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border 
to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States; 
                                                 
119 Id. at 604. (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate 
foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to 
citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and 
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations”). 
120 See id. at 549 (“Immigration law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years under the 
domination of the plenary power doctrine, represents an aberrational form of the typical relationship between 
statutory interpretation and constitutional law. The aberrant quality is attributable to the prolonged nature of 
the contradiction between these two sets of “constitutional” norms in immigration law. The constitutional 
norms that courts use when they directly decide constitutional issues in immigration cases are not the same 
constitutional norms that inform interpretation of immigration statutes. To serve the latter function, many 
courts have relied on what I call “phantom constitutional norms,” which are not indigenous to immigration 
law but come from mainstream public law instead. The result has been to undermine the plenary power 
doctrine through statutory interpretation.) (internal citations omitted) 
121 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
122 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037 (2008). 
123 Id. 
124 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
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(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and which are 
cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the admission, 
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, if he has reason to believe that the 
person so arrested is guilty of such felony and if there is likelihood of the person 
escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested 
shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available officer 
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the 
United States; and 
 (5) to make arrests [for any offense against the United States or felony] if the 
officer or employee is performing duties relating to the enforcement of the 
immigration laws at the time of the arrest and if there is a likelihood of the person 
escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.125 
 
The law recognizes the protected status of the home, requiring either consent or a 
properly-executed warrant to enter onto farm land or any agricultural operation to 
interrogate individuals as to their right to be in the United States.126 As for “reasonable 
distance,” lower courts have held that this provision, which allows the Attorney General 
to ascertain how far from the border probable cause and a warrant is not required, is not 
unconstitutional because it does not insert a neutral magistrate into the review process.127 
 In terms of searches at the border itself, 
 
Any officer or employee of the [immigration] [s]ervice authorized and designated 
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, whether individually or as 
one of a class, shall have power to conduct a search, without warrant, of the 
person, and of the personal effects in the possession of any person seeking 
admission to the United States, concerning whom such officer or employee may 
have reasonable cause to suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission to the 
United States under this chapter which would be disclosed by such search.128 
 
The standard is thus one of “reasonable cause.” Congress, to date, has not made any 
special exceptions for the personal effects that may be searched, with the result that, as 
noted in the introduction, guidance on electronic devices has been left to the agencies 
themselves. 
IV. BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
 
There are increasing calls in the public to exempt electronic devices from the border 
search exception. The argument put forward is that these devices contain a tremendous 
amount of private information. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riley v. 
California, United States v. Jones, and Carpenter v. United States, courts generally 
rejected the argument based either on the grounds that the search was routine and did not 
require reasonable suspicion (pursuant to the border search exception), or that it was 
conducted with reasonable suspicion. However, three courts determined that forensic 
examination requires a higher standard than exists in the ordinary border search 
exception. Following Riley, Jones, and Carpenter, moreover, there is every reason to 
                                                 
125 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a). 
126 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(e). 
127 United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, Bowen v. United States, 
422 U.S. 916 (1975). 
128 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(c). 
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believe that the Fourth Amendment places a limit on the search of electronic devices, at 
least as to U.S. persons and individuals who have a substantial connection to the United 
States. 
A. Not Subject to Reasonable Suspicion 
Although the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano left open the possibility, under 
certain circumstances, of requiring reasonable suspicion for particular property searches 
at the border, some courts have considered the search of electronic devices to fall within 
the ordinary border search exception.129 In United States v. Arnold, for instance, a traveler 
arrived at LAX after a nearly twenty-hour flight from the Philippines.130 When he went to 
clear customs, CBP pulled him aside for secondary questioning, inspected his luggage, 
and found a laptop, a separate hard drive, a USB stick, and six disks. Agents directed Mr. 
Arnold to turn on his computer. On the desktop, there were folders labeled “Kodak 
Pictures” and “Kodak Memories.” When agents opened the folders, they found naked 
women. CBP called in DHS and ICE, who, believing the pictures to include children, 
detained and questioned him. They seized his computer and the storage devices and, a 
fortnight later, obtained a warrant. DOJ charged Michael Arnold with transporting child 
pornography. Despite the considerable amount of information that could be held on the 
computer, the court did not see any Fourth Amendment concerns. Neither of the two 
narrow grounds laid out by the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano that would require 
reasonable suspicion (“exceptional damage to property” or “particularly offensive 
manner”) applied.131 “[W]e are satisfied that reasonable suspicion is not needed for 
customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the 
border.”132 When a similar case arose in regard to fraudulent alien cards, which were 
found on a traveler’s hard drive while crossing the border, the Ninth Circuit considered 
the requirement of reasonable suspicion to be foreclosed by Arnold.133 
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Ickes.134 In that 
case, the defendant, driving a van that appeared to be packed with everything he owned, 
crossed the U.S./Canadian border. A search of the van uncovered a video camera with a 
tape of a tennis match in which the camera was focused on a young ball boy. Border 
agents found marijuana seeds and pipes and several photo albums of child pornography. 
They also found a computer and 75 diskettes with additional child pornography on them. 
The court found the search permissible:  
 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have made clear that extensive searches at 
the border are permitted, even if the same search elsewhere would not be. We 
refust to undermine this well-settled law by restrictively reading the statutory 
language in 19 U.S.C. 1581(a) or by carving out a First Amendment exception to 
the border search doctrine.135 
 
At least one other published lower court published opinion has reached a similar 
conclusion.136 
                                                 
129 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004). 
130 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). 
131 Id. at 1008-09. 
132 Id. at 1009.  
133 United States v. Singh, 295 Fed. App’x. 190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
134 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
135 Id. at 502. 
136 See, e.g., United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (A name check on a driver 
crossing at Del Rio, Texas Port of entry from Mexico showed that the individual was the subject of an 
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B. Supported by Reasonable Suspicion 
Two categories of cases have found the search of electronic devices to be supported 
by reasonable suspicion: those premised on criminal investigations and records, and those 
based on the presence of illegal substances. In United States v. Hassanshahi, for example, 
a 2014 case from Washington, D.C., a traveler’s laptop was seized during an international 
border stop at a U.S. airport.137 An inquiry into the traveler’s identity revealed a federal 
investigation into the defendant’s participation in a conspiracy to build a computer 
production facility in Iran in violation of U.S. trade embargoes. The court in that case 
considered agents to have established reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a 
forensic examination of the laptop. Similarly, in United States v. Saboonchi, the traveler’s 
name came up in connection with two different export violation investigations.138 The 
government had information that the defendant had purchased two cyclone separators 
which had then been shipped overseas to an entity linked to a company in Iran. The court 
determined that the forensic search of the defendant’s smart phone and flash drive had 
been supported by reasonable suspicion. Pari passu, in Cotterman, border agents had 
reasonable suspicion for their initial search based on the fact that the defendant had a 
prior conviction for child molestation, frequently traveled to a country associated with 
sex tourism, and carried password-protected files. A handful of lower courts have found 
the presence of illegal substances during the search to be sufficient for the examination of 
electronic devices.139 
C. Special Protections Extended to Forensic Investigations 
One of the most prominent cases on the forensic investigation of electronic devices at the 
border comes from the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Cotterman, agents entered a 
traveler’s name into the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) which 
revealed a 15-year old child sexual molestation charge. Agents referred the defendant and 
his wife for secondary questioning, ordering them to leave their car and belongings 
behind. A search of the vehicle yielded two laptop computers with password-protected 
files. The defendant offered to assist agents in accessing the information, but the agent 
declined because of concern that the defendant would use the opportunity to sabotage the 
                                                                                                                                     
investigation in New York involving child pornography. The defendant was referred to secondary inspection 
where, two hours later, ICE began to question him about his computer equipment, including a zip drive and 
two external hard drives as well as a laptop that had been observed in vehicle. He consented to the search and 
provided them with the password, whereupon they found child pornography on the device. The court rules 
the search constitutional). See also United States v. Hampe, Crim. No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365 (D. Me. 
Apr. 18, 2007). The court in this case held that the search of a laptop was a routine search and no reasonable 
suspicion was required, but it then concluded that the particular facts of the case gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion that child pornography was involved. 
137 United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014). 
138 United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014). 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 267, F. Supp. 3d 911 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (mobile phone searched 
with reasonable suspicion at Mexican border after agents found methamphetamine in the traveler’s suitcase); 
United States v. Mendez, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Ariz. 2017) (mobile phone search at border after finding 
drugs in the car considered to have been conducted with reasonable suspicion); United States v. Cano, 222 F. 
Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (agents, finding 16 kg of cocaine in the spare tire of the defendant’s truck had 
reasonable suspicion to download mobile phone data on grounds that it had been used as an instrumentality 
of the crime); United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (agents found methamphetamine 
in the car and questioned defendant who said he been in cell phone communication with person to whom he 
was reporting; court determined that DHS manual search of phone and examination of incoming calls, text 
messages, and the call log was reasonable); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (S..D. Cal. 
2016) (CBP found illegal drugs in defendant’s car and searched the defendant’s mobile phone which had 
photos of large sums of money; the court said reasonable, particularized suspicion present). 
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files. Agents seized the computers and transported them to Tucson, 150 miles away, for 
forensic evaluation. After three days, seventy-five images of child pornography had been 
found. The court determined that border searches were limited in time and distance: 
agents needed to have reasonable suspicion that the subject was involved in criminal 
activity. Mere suspicion was not enough.140 The court recognized the unique nature of the 
type of information contained in electronic devices:  
 
The amount of private information carried by international travelers was 
traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler's luggage or automobile. 
This is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses 
full of information.* * *Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously 
offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our lives: 
financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private 
emails.* * *Electronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information 
far beyond the point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and 
records of deleted files. This quality makes it impractical, if not impossible, for 
individuals to make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to 
expose to the scrutiny that accompanies international travel.141 
 
A second case from the District Court in Maryland held that the border search of any 
computer or electronic device should be considered non-routine and require reasonable 
suspicion.142 The court’s argument was that, while the government has legitimate 
concerns about child pornography, it does not justify unfettered crime-fighting searches 
or an unregulated assault on citizens’ private information—which is what is involved in 
forensic examination of a hard drive. The court took a different approach than the Ninth 
Circuit in Cotterman: in the former, the court determined that the forensic search of a 
computer that had been imaged was as invasive of the defendant’s privacy as a strip 
search. In Saboonchi, the Maryland court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s failure to 
provide guidelines for what constituted a “forensic” search. The court distinguished 
between routine and non-routine border searches and tried to construct a test for 
determining when a conventional computer search becomes a forensic investigation: 
 
A conventional search at the border of a computer or device may include a 
Customs officer booting it up and operating it to review its contents, and 
seemingly, also would allow (but is not necessarily limited to) reviewing a 
computer's directory tree or using its search functions to seek out and view the 
contents of specific files or file types. . . . And, just as a luggage lock does not 
render the contents of a suitcase immune from search, a password protected file 
is not unsearchable on that basis alone.143 
 
In contrast, “[i]n a forensic search of electronic storage, a bitstream copy is created and 
then is searched by an expert using highly specialized analytical software—often over the 
course of several days, weeks, or months—to locate specific files or file types, recover 
hidden, deleted, or encrypted data, and analyze the structure of files and of a drive.”144 
The court provided three explanations for why forensic searches should be considered sui 
                                                 
140 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (requiring reasonable suspicion for 
forensic examination of the laptop). 
141 709 F.3d at 964-65. 
142 U.S. v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014). 
143 Id. at 560-61. 
144 Id. at 561. 
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generis: first, it creates a copy and uses specialized software to analyze the computer’s 
contents; second, it provides access to deleted material; third, it provides insight into an 
individual’s actions away from the border which would not otherwise be discoverable.145
 The First Circuit, in evaluating other kinds of searches, offered the following non-
exhaustive list of factors may be relevant when determining whether a search can be 
characterized as routine: 
 
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires 
the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials 
and the suspect occurs during the search; (iii) whether force is used to effect the 
search; (iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; (v) 
the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (vi) whether the 
suspect's reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the 
search.146 
D. Riley v. California: Stronger Constitutional Protections for Mobile Devices 
 The above cases pre-dated Riley v. California,147 in which the Supreme Court “made 
it clear that the breadth and volume of data stored on computers and other smart devices 
make today's technology different in ways that have serious implications for the Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”148 One of the first border search cases to incorporate and apply 
Riley was United States v. Kim, in which the court determined that the question of 
electronic searches was settled neither by the border exception nor by application of what 
was meant by “forensic.” Instead, it considered the extent to which the search “intrudes 
upon an individual's privacy, and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”149 The court noted: 
 
while the courts in Ickes, Cotterman, and Saboonchi had little in the way of 
Supreme Court precedent to guide their way, the Supreme Court has since issued 
its opinion in Riley v. California. And in Riley, the Court made it clear that the 
breadth and volume of data stored on computers and other smart devices make 
today’s technology different in ways that have serious implications for the Fourth 
Amendment analysis.150 
 
 Riley dealt with the search of a mobile phone incident to arrest. In that case, the Court 
underscored the distinction between electronic devices and physical items. “Modern cell 
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicate by the 
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”151 Even the term was misleading, as 
“many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to 
be used as a telephone.”152 A key distinguishing feature is the “immense storage 
capacity” of such devices: “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have 
received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or 
                                                 
145 Id. at 563. See also Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of 
Electronic Devices After Riley v. California, U.S.ATTY’S BULL., Nov. 2014, at 10. 
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147 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
148 United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54 (D.D.C. 2015).  
149 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
150 Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 54. 
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152 Id. at 2489. 
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article they have read.”153 Mobile phones can store “millions of pages of text, thousands 
of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”154 The sheer capacity of mobile devices has numerous 
implications for privacy: 
 
First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an 
address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more 
in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's capacity allows 
even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. 
The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a thousand 
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be 
said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data on 
a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person 
might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he 
would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past 
several months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.155 
 
More than 90% of American adults own and carry cell phones, keeping “on their person a 
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”156 
The type of information that could be gleaned, moreover, different in important respects 
from what could be uncovered from the search of a physical item. Medical records, 
location information, relationship details, political beliefs, religious convictions—all of 
this, more than could be ascertained even from a search of an individual’s home, can be 
gleaned.157 Beyond this, mobile phones provide a gateway to the cloud. The court in Riley 
was utterly unsatisfied with the solution the government proposed here: namely, “to 
disconnect a phone from the network before searching the device.”158 (This is precisely 
what CBP is doing in regard to search of electronic devices at the border).  
 In Kim, as aforementioned, the court applied Riley and determined, under a totality of 
circumstances test, that the imaging and search of a laptop, for an unlimited period and 
without any limits on the scope of the analysis, invaded the traveler’s privacy to such an 
extent that it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.159 The court noted: “given 
the vast storage capacity of even the most basic laptops, and the capacity of computers to 
retain metadata and even deleted material, one cannot treat an electronic storage device 
like a handbag simply because you can put things in it and then carry it onto a plane.”160  
 The Kim case is notable not just for its application of Riley, but because it involved a 
conscious decision by investigators to wait until a suspect left the United States before 
using the border exception to search his laptop and thereby obtain detailed information 
about his activities.161 The court ultimately rejected agents’ instrumentalist approach—
i.e., using the border search exception to obtain information to which they otherwise 
would not be entitled.162 
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E. Impact of Carpenter v. United States  
 As with Riley, the Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States has 
significant implications for how to think about potential Fourth Amendment limits on 
electronic border searches. In Carpenter, the Court decided not to extend third party 
doctrine from United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland to cell site location 
information (CSLI).163 In United States v. Jones, five justices (the so-called “shadow 
majority”) had adopted the view that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the whole of their physical movements.164 The Carpenter court built on Jones, 
underscoring the sensitivity of the information that could be gleaned from location data. 
It highlighted a number of factors that suggested a higher privacy incursion: accuracy; 
retroactive application; length of time (implicating the amount of information); the 
revealing nature of the information; the nature of the information obtained; and the ease 
with which it could be obtained.165 
 These elements are all present in the border search of electronic devices, suggesting a 
higher intrusion into travelers’ privacy than is present with the simple search of a 
traveler’s baggage or pockets. To the extent that electronic devices contain a record of the 
traveler’s physical movements, warrantless search runs directly contrary to the holding in 
Carpenter. 
F. The Problem of Digitization 
 The two streams of authorities, customs and immigration, both deal with the 
transportation of physical objects: articles and people. Before concluding, it is worth 
noting that digitization presents two particular challenges for these regimes.  
First, for customs, what happens when the illicit materials being sought are digital, 
and not physical? In the past, if an object was carried into the country, then the inspection 
regime would uncover it at the border. But what happens if the illicit material can merely 
be uploaded onto the cloud, to be accessed once someone enters the United States? If a 
traveler in Thailand, for instance, uploads child pornography onto the cloud, should there 
be a way to use the traveler’s movement to uncover the material? Or what if the material 
in question consists of documents, such as plans for a nuclear reactor or technology 
designs which have been forbidden by the export regime. Should a traveler be able to 
upload this material to the cloud, only to pull it down elsewhere? In the past, the material 
would have either have been mailed through the post, or carried by hand. Should there be 
a way to foreclose a digital end-run around the customs regime?  
There are at least three possible responses to this argument. Foremost, it is important 
to note that part of the reason this issue even presents is because of the post-War 
expansion of the customs mail search regime to include not just uncustomed items, but 
also child pornography, weapons of mass destruction, emergency matters under the 
IEEPA, and the like. The historical purpose of the customs regime was not to uncover 
illegal activity generally. The purpose of customs searches was to identify the illegal 
transportation of contraband or undeclared items.166 To the extent that a border search 
exception, derived from sovereignty applies, it is specifically with this end in mind. 
In addition, in light of the expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) post-9/11 and the infamous demise of the wall, such matters may be relegated 
more appropriately to the surveillance realm. That is, to the extent that matters, such as 
drawings of a nuclear reactor being provided to third countries, implicate foreign affairs, 
                                                 
163 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
164 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
165 Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, slip op. at 12-22 (June 22, 2018). 
166 U.S. v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 24 
surveillance would appropriately fall within FISA. Even where the investigation may be 
primarily criminal in nature, such surveillance still comes within FISA’s ambit. 
Further, to the extent that electronic searches reveal information that would otherwise 
be held in the home, then allowing such searches forces the historic protections afforded 
to the home, even in customs matters, to drop away. Email has replaced letter 
correspondence, electronic calendars now take the place of planners, and the contacts list 
now serves as a telephone book. The border exception, applied to electronic devices, 
threatens to swallow the protections which, for centuries, have limited customs searches. 
This is true not just for the type of data at stake, but actual views of the home. Consider, 
for instance, the Blink Home Monitor. An application can be downloaded to smartphones 
and tablets, providing homeowners with real-time coverage of what is happening inside 
their houses.167  
 The second challenge presents for immigration. Here, part of the reason behind 
subjecting non-citizens to searches prior to entering the United States has to do with 
ascertaining (a) whether they are who they say they are, and (b) what sorts of individuals 
are being admitted to the country. Surely, the type of information present in travelers’ 
electronic devices is relevant to such a determination. By not taking into account social 
media, or the full range of an individual’s background, moreover, U.S. security may be 
harmed. Notwithstanding PPD-28 and its extension to non-citizens of privacy rights, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Verdugo-Urquidez, non-U.S. persons without a 
substantial connection to the United States lack Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Like the search incident to arrest exception at issue in Riley, the border search exception 
is still subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Numerous 
cases are beginning to move through the courts, challenging whether electronic devices 
fall outside constitutional norms.168 The American Bar Association has raised particular 
concerns about the extent to which the reading, duplication, and seizure of legal 
documents violates client-attorney privilege.169 Similar issues have been raised in regard 
                                                 
167 See https://blinkforhome.com/pages/blink-home-monitor-app?locale=en&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIpZ-
lhMeS3AIVC4GzCh2AQQZnEAAYASAAEgJCM_D_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds. 
168 See, e.g., Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y 2013) (dual U.S./French citizen had laptop 
searched confiscated at Canadian border and returned eleven days later, with evidence that his personal files 
(including his research, photos, chats with his girlfriend) had been searched); Complaint, Alasaad v. Duke, 
1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. filed Sept. 13, 2017) (challenging search and seizure of smartphones, laptop, 
and other electronic devices at the U.S. border in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments). See also 
Daniel Victor, Forced Searches of Phones and Laptops at U.S. Border are Illegal, Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/technology/aclu-border-patrol-lawsuit.html; 
Deb Riechmann, Are Searches of Laptops and Cellphones by Border Agents Unconstitutional?, PBS (Sept. 
13, 2017) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/searches-laptops-cellphones-border-agents-
unconstitutional/. 
169 See, e.g., Looper v. Morgan, Civ. No. H-92-0294, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10241 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 
1995); U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass 1950); Upjohn Co v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383 (1981). This creates a possible conflict between Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which deals with Confidentiality of Information, and searches at the border. Under 
work product doctrine, such materials are not discoverable (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)), although it can be 
overcome by the demonstration of “substantial need” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). There is a distinction to 
be drawn between attorney-client material generally versus information and material related to litigation, the 
confidentiality requirement, and common interest doctrine. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co. 
Ltd., 211 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The ABA Criminal Justice Section currently has a Task Force 
looking into electronic border searches, considering, inter alia, the impact on client-attorney privilege. 
 25 
to doctor-patient records, and journalists’ privileges, spousal communications, 
information covered by a U.S. federal court protective order, proprietary information, and 
intellectual property. 
As a matter of constitutional law, at least in terms of the Fourth Amendment issues, 
the Court’s recent decisions in Riley and Carpenter, and the concerns raised by the 
shadow majority in Jones, suggest that electronic devices warrant a higher level of 
protection. As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, the Court in United States v. Ickes 
found such arguments to be unpersuasive.170 In that case, Ickes argued that border search 
doctrine does not apply when the material being searched is expressive. “[T]his cannot be 
the case,” the court wrote. That doctrine “is justified by the ‘longstanding right of the 
sovereign to protect itself.’”171 National security interests in the contemporary age 
inescapably implicate expressive material, such as terrorist communications. Recognizing 
First Amendment interests, moreover, would create difficulties in determining where the 
line should be drawn.172 Notwithstanding the court’s decision in Ickes, the implications of 
access to electronic devices for religious freedom, free speech, and free association are 
substantial. The type of information contained in mobile phones, tablet, and computers, 
goes to the most intimate aspects of individuals’ politics, beliefs, and relationships. One 
of the more recent cases to raise these issues settled.173 In addition to the important 
Fourth and First Amendment issues at stake are those related to the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, as well as due process, and the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 
As recognized in the introduction to these written remarks, border searches of 
electronic devices are increasing at an alarming rate. Thus far, CBP and ICE have been 
largely left to determine, for themselves, whether and to what extent they can search 
travelers’ devices. While border searches are supported by claims of sovereignty, 
technological advances increasingly implicate individual rights. In Riley, the Government 
offered as an alternative that it be allowed to develop its own protocols to address the 
unique questions posed by cloud technologies. The Court observed, “the Founders did not 
fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”174 The Founders 
fought for rights—rights that are now endangered by the government’s search of  
electronic devices as citizens depart, and re-enter, the United States. The time is ripe for 
Congress to take action. 
 
 
 
                                                 
170 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-08 (4th Cir. 2005). 
171 Id. at 506 (internal citations omitted). 
172 Id. 
173 House v. Napolitano, No. 11-cv-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (David House, 
part of the Bradley Manning Support Network, had his laptop seized at the border and imaged). 
174 Id. 
